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Abstract: Since its debut in the 18th century, the P-value has been an integral part of hypothesis 
testing based scientific discoveries. As the statistical engine ages, questions are beginning to be 
raised, asking to what extent scientific discoveries based on a P-value (e.g., the practice of 
drawing scientific conclusions relying on the fact that the P-value is smaller than an artificially 
determined threshold, for example, that of 0.05) are reliable and reproducible, and the voice 
calling for adjusting the significance level of 0.05 or banning the P-value has been increasingly 
heard. Inspired by these questions, we inquire into the useful roles and misuses of the P-value in 
scientific studies. We attempt to unravel the associations between the P-value, sample size, 
significance level, and statistical power. For common misuses and misinterpretations of the P-
value, we provide modest recommendations for practitioners. Additionally, we review, with a 
comparison, Bayesian alternatives to the P-value, and discuss the advantages of meta-analysis in 
combining information, reducing bias, and delivering reproducible evidence. Taken together, we 
argue that the P-value underpins a useful probabilistic decision-making system, provides 
evidence at a continuous scale, and allows for integrating results from multiple studies and data 
sets. But the interpretation must be contextual, taking into account the scientific question, 
experimental design (including the sample size and significance level), statistical power, effect 
size, and reproducibility. 
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“Most statisticians are all too familiar with conversations [that] start:  
Q: What is the purpose of your analysis?  
A: I want to do a significance test.  
Q: No, I mean what is the overall objective?  
A (with puzzled look): I want to know if my results are significant.  
And so on....” [1]. 
 
 
David Hume argued in A Treatise of Human Nature that “all knowledge degenerates into 
probability” (2). In humans, probable inference is chief in guiding decisions [3–5]. Sports fans 
make bets on the likelihood that a club will win the next game. Investors decide to buy or sell a 
stock based on how likely it is to go up or down. One chooses whether to bring an umbrella given 
the chance of rain. What about scientists? How does probability guide scientific enquiries [6]? 
One of the most widely used principles in scientific decision-making is P-value based 
hypothesis testing. To form a basic idea about its popularity, text mining using 385,393 PubMed 
Central (PMC) full-text articles from 1990 to 2015 identified 3,438,299 appearances of P-values; 
that is, about nine P-values per article [7]. Being integral to hypothesis-testing based decision-
making, the P-value has interested biomedical scientists [8], clinicians [9], social scientists [10], 
and philosophers [11], no less than statisticians.  
“P values, the 'gold standard' of statistical validity, are not as reliable as many scientists 
assume” [12]. As a probabilistic statement underpinning decision-making, it has generated debate 
over its epistemic and practical status [13–19]. Central to the debate are the inconsistency of the 
P-value and the credibility of it being a measure of evidence through which scientific conclusions 
are drawn regarding a hypothesis (cf., the base rate fallacy in Table 1). To raise protection against 
false positive studies, scholars suggested lowering the significance level from 0.05 to 0.005 
[20,21]. Others asked whether the P-value (and the significance test) should be banned [22–24]. 
The Basic and Applied Social Psychology (BASP) journal, at perhaps the extreme end of the 
spectrum, casted an editorial ban on the P-value [25].   
There is good reason for doubts. Many scientific conclusions are based on hypothesis tests 
and their P-values. But, as we argue below, the fact that a P-value is smaller than a threshold alone 
(our emphasis) does not guarantee that a certain hypothesis is true. Although it has facilitated a 
great deal of scientific discoveries, a wide application of a concept does not equal a rigorous proof 
of that concept. Consequently, there is also good reason to have a thorough reflection on and 
discussion about the P-value, from its origin to its definition, its usefulness, its misuses, and 
potential resolutions.  
Some arguments we add into existing discussions about the P-value, although deceptively 
simple, are not trivial, for ultimately they aim to address questions related to probable inference 
that have preoccupied statisticians, biologists, and philosophers – including subjective probability 
[4], probabilism [6], evidence-based analysis [26,27], and knowledge deduction and induction 
[28]. We are fortunate to have access to a repertoire of scholarly written works contributed by 
many pioneers in statistical, biological, medical, clinical, and philosophical studies. Only through 
standing on their shoulders are we able to peer into the central problems and make our addition. 
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And only by referring to and extracting from their views are we able to find arguments that 
complement ours and make this piece a relatively complete one.  
We begin our journey with a brief historical account of the P-value and present its formal 
definition and real-world implementations. Next, we outline the roles the P-value plays in science 
and how it advances causal inference. Then, we present common misuses and misinterpretations 
of the P-value and offer modest recommendations for treating these issues. Using logical 
arguments and examples, we stress that the interpretation of the P-value must be contextual, taking 
into account the scientific question, experimental design (including the sample size and 
significance level), statistical power, effect size, and reproducibility. Additionally, we present the 
Bayesian alternative to the P-value and discuss a few advantages of performing meta-analysis to 
integrate information from multiple studies and data sets. We conclude with a discussion. 
 
The Rise of the P-value 
As with so much else that came to mould the discussion of hypothesis testing and the P-value, the 
origin of these concepts is difficult to trace. The earliest known hypothesis test was performed by 
John Arbuthnot. Having observed that the number of males born in London exceeded the number 
of females for 82 years (1629 - 1710), Arbuthnot calculated that the probability of this happening 
was 0.582 [29]. Based on this small likelihood, Arbuthnot decided to reject, in modern terms, the 
(null) hypothesis that the birth rates for male and females are equal because the probability is so 
small (P = 0.582). This number is perhaps the first example of a P-value; namely the chance of 
observing the same phenomenon 82 years in a row, provided the birth rates are equal.  
It is useful at this point to introduce the formal definition of the P-value. This will facilitate 
our discussion in later sections.  
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Fig. 1. A recap of the P-value and related concepts. (a) Calculating the P-value. In the example outlined 
in (a), the P-value is the largest possible probability that the prevalence of the disease in the population 
was to be more than 20% (grey dot), under the null distribution (that the prevalence was 10%, indicated by 
the black dot). In other words, the P-value is the probability density over the shaded orange areas (and 
beyond). The probability density decreases from the center outwards (highest at the center) and the 
probability right of the shaded area is approaching zero (e.g., at the white dot). (b) Significance level (type 
I error), type II error, and power. The significance level (type I error or 𝛼) is a predetermined value (say 
0.05) that quantifies the false positive rate. In other words, given that the null hypothesis were true, what is 
the probability of observing extreme values (red shades). The type II error (or 𝛽) quantifies the false 
negative rate. In other words, given that the alternative hypothesis were true, what is the probability of 
failing to reject the null hypothesis (blue shades). The power (or 1 − 𝛽) quantifies the true positive rate. In 
other words, given that the alternative hypothesis were true, what is the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis (yellow shades). The true negative rate (or 1 − 𝛼) quantifies the probability of failing to reject 
the null hypothesis when it is true (represented by the white area – not completely shown - under the null 
hypothesis curve). (c) Roger Penrose’s three-world system - the physical world, the Platonic mathematical 
world, and the mental world - and our modification of it. The physical world represents the entire universe 
(from every chemical element to every individual) and contains properties that are not readily accessible to 
the observer. These properties are governed by and can be explained using mathematical principles. The 
mathematical principles translate into (mental) understanding and form one’s perspective about the 
physical world. (d) The triad of population, sample, and the P-value in making causal enquires. Consider 
an example where a clinician was inquiring into the prevalence of a disease in a specific age group (i.e., a 
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specific population). Suppose the clinician considered a null hypothesis where the prevalence was 10% (in 
the population). Since measuring the prevalence of a disease in a population was impractical, the clinician 
selected a random sample of ten individuals from the population falling in that age group (see left arrow) 
and found that two had the disease (see top circle). The clinician then conducted a hypothesis test which 
generated a P-value of 0.26 (see right arrow; see text for calculation) and used this to make inference about 
the population (see bottom arrow). Given the P-value, the clinician concluded that there was not enough 
evidence (at a significance level of 0.05) from the sample that would reject the null hypothesis (made about 
the population).  
 
Defining the P-value 
A clinician was interested in estimating the prevalence of a disorder in a specific age group. Having 
no prior information about the disease, the clinician hypothesized that the prevalence was 10% in 
that age group. That is, the clinician hypothesized that the unobserved (population, or true) 
prevalence was at 𝜇! = 0.1 (see the black dot in Fig. 1 (a)) with some variability. The outcome of 
an individual 𝑖 was recorded as 𝑥", where 𝑥" was either 1 (diseased) or 0 (healthy), for 𝑖 =1, 2, … ,10; hence  the null assumed a binomial distribution with mean 𝜇! and variance 𝑛𝜇!(1 −𝜇!), that is, 𝑋" 	~	𝐵(𝑛, 𝜇!) where 𝑛 is the number of individuals and 𝑋" 	 denotes the random 
outcome of individual 𝑖 (see Fig. 1 (b)). Under the clinician’s (null) hypothesis, the probability of 
the prevalence in a random sample being of 𝜇! = 𝑥 was the highest for 𝑥 = 0.1 and decaying as x 
departed from the center (0.1) (as illustrated by the height of the curve). To test whether the 
hypothesis was correct or not, the clinician went on to select a random sample of ten individuals 
of the age group. Next, the clinician calculated the sample incidence of these ten individuals, 𝑇(𝒙) = ∑ $!"#!$"%! , and used this as the test statistic. Suppose out of the ten individuals, two had the 
disease, that is, 𝑇(𝒙) = 0.2. Finally, the clinician tested how unlikely (or likely) the evidence from 
the sample would support the hypothesis (𝜇! = 0.1) – by calculating the P-value. In plain 
language, the P-value is the maximal probability (maximal is taken when there are a set of null 
hypotheses) that the sample incidence rate was going to be more than 0.2 under the null hypothesis 
(thus, the smaller the P-value, the less stronger an evidence from the sample with 20% incident 
rate supported the hypothesis of 10% prevalence). Figuratively (and literally), the P-value 
integrated the probability density (under a binomial distribution 𝐵(10, 0.2)) over the orange 
shaded area in Fig. 1 (a).  
Formally, statistical hypothesis testing generally begins with a (null) hypothesis and ends 
with comparing the P-value with a pre-determined significance level to make a decision. There are 
other types of hypothesis tests; we restrict ourselves here to the standard hypothesis test defined 
as follows. A null hypothesis ℋ!: 𝑋	~	𝑓(𝑥) contains a statement where the data 𝑋 (e.g., the disease 
statuses of the ten selected individuals) are drawn from a underlying distribution denoted by a 
function 𝑓(e.g., 𝐵(𝑛, 𝜇!)). A statistic 𝑇(𝑿) is chosen to investigate how much the null hypothesis 
is supported by the observed data: a large value of 𝑇 indicates there is small evidence (from the 
data) supporting the null. The P-value of a sample 𝒙, or 𝑝(𝒙), is thus defined as the supremum 
probability of a test statistic being greater than a critical value under the null hypothesis, namely, 
 𝑝(𝒙&'() = 𝑠𝑢𝑝)∈+#ℙ)(𝑇(𝑿) ≥ 𝑇(𝒙&'())	                  (1) 
 
where 𝒙&'( are the observed data, bold 𝒙 indicates that the data could be multiple-dimensional, 
and Θ! is the space for the set of parameters of the null hypothesis (e.g., the hypothesized 
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prevalence 𝜇!). In the above example, the P-value would be 𝑝 = ℙ(𝑇(𝑋) ≥ 0.2	|	𝑋	~	𝐵(𝑛, 𝜇!)) = ∑ A10𝑖 B (0.1)"(0.9)%!," ≈ 0.26.%!"-.                    
 
By definition, the P-value quantifies, if the null hypothesis were true, the largest probability 
of extreme cases happening. Said in a different way, the P-value does not give the probability 
that the null hypothesis is false; rather, it gives the probability of obtaining data at least as 
extreme as those observed, if the null hypothesis were true.  
 
In the above example, if the P-value is larger than a pre-determined significance level 𝛼 
(e.g., 𝛼 = 0.05), that means there is a more than a tolerable chance of having a prevalence of less 
than 𝜇! under the null hypothesis – the sample thus fails to reject the null. If the P-value is smaller 
than 𝛼, we say that the observed prevalence can only happen with small probability if the null were 
true - the sample evidence thus supports rejecting the null. 
 
 
Table 1. Glossary and abbreviations in hypothesis test based scientific investigations. 
 
 
Terminology 
 
Abbreviation Definition 
0.05  
A significance level (see Type I error below) arbitrarily coined by R. A. Fisher partly 
for convenience. “The value for which P = .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2 (standard 
deviations from the center of a normal distribution; our insertion); it is convenient to 
take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be considered significant 
or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation are thus formally regarded 
as significant” [30]. 
0.005  An popular alternative for the significance level [20,21]. 
Alternative 
hypothesis 
𝐻% A statement that is complementary to the null hypothesis that there is likely something (scientifically interesting) happening. 
Base rate fallacy  
Equating sample evidence given by the P-value to the likelihood of an alternative 
hypothesis being true (e.g., a drug being effective). 
Bayes factor 𝐾 or 𝐵%& It compares how likely the data is generated from hypothesized model 1 (𝐻!) as compared to hypothesized model 2 (𝐻"); and hence the larger the 𝐾, the stronger 
evidence the data supports 𝐻! over 𝐻". 
Bayesian evidence 𝑃(𝐻'|𝑥) The posterior probability of 𝐻# given data 𝑥. 
Causal inference  
The study of the existence and strength of directed connection between a cause (e.g., 
a drug) and an effect (e.g., alleviated disease symptoms). 
Critical value 
of the test 
Testcrit, or 
CVtest 
The (critical) point for deciding between hypotheses (see the point at which blue and 
red shades divide in Fig. 1 (d)). 
Effect size  
A measure that is used to quantify the magnitude of a property of interest, such as 
the regression coefficient, or the correlation coefficient. It is usually accompanied by 
a P-value, suggesting its statistical significance. 
Evidence-based 
data analysis 
 
The application of scientific method to the practice of data analysis by performing 
empirical studies to identify statistical methods, analysis protocols, and software that 
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leads to increased replicability and reproducibility in the hands of users with basic 
knowledge [27]. 
Fisher’s test  
A hypothesis test designed by R. A. Fisher, including the following procedures: (F1) 
selecting a test; (F2) setting up the null hypothesis; (F3) calculating the P-value; (F4) 
assessing statistical significance; (F5) interpreting the results. 
Hypothesis test 𝐻 A hypothesis test is a statistical test that inquiries into the data obtained from a sample of a population, via a statistical framework, so as to make inference about (unknown) 
properties of the population. 
Neyman-Pearson 
test 
NP test 
A hypothesis test designed by Egon Pearson and Jerzy Neyman, including the 
following procedures: (NP1) Setting up the expected effect size; (NP2) selecting an 
optimal test; (NP3) setting up the main hypothesis (similar to Fisher’s null hypothesis); 
(NP4) setting up the alternative (research) hypothesis (this is a major difference from 
the Fisher’s test); (NP5) calculating the sample size required for good power (this is 
another major difference from the Fisher’s test); (NP6) calculating the critical value 
(see Table 1) for the test; (NP7) calculating the test-statistic for the research; (NP8) 
deciding whether to reject the main hypothesis or not. 
Null hypothesis 𝐻' A statement or default hypothesis that there is nothing (scientifically interesting) happening (e.g., two treatments have equal efficacy in a (two-sided) superiority trial), or the discovery is not as interesting as expected (e.g., the experimental treatment is 
worse than (i.e., inferior to) the control treatment in a non-inferiority trial). 
Null hypothesis 
significance testing 
NHST 
A hybrid hypothesis test combining the Fisher’s test and the NP test: it follows the NP 
test procedurally and Fisher’s test philosophically. 
P-hacking  
Manipulating statistical methods to find a P-value that is significant or conducting 
several statistical tests and only reporting those that are significant. Also known as 
data snooping, data dredging, or data fishing. 
Power 1 − 𝛽 It quantifies the true positive rate. In other words, given that the alternative hypothesis 
was true, what is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. 
P-value P 
The P-value of a sample is the supremum probability of a test statistic being greater 
than a critical value under the null hypothesis. 
Sample size N The number of observations or replicates in a sample selected from a population. 
Test statistic 
for the research 
RVtest 
A number calculated from the sample (such as the sample mean), which can be 
compared with CVtest to determine the P-value. See statistics T(x) in Equation (1). 
Transposed 
conditional fallacy 
 Interpreting the P-value as posterior probability 𝑃(𝐻#|𝑥). 
True negative 1 − 𝛼 It quantifies the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis were it true. 
Type I error 
(Significance level)  
𝛼 It quantifies the false positive rate. In other words, given that the null hypothesis was true, what is the probability of observing extreme values. It is typically set at a 
predetermined value (say 0.1, 0.05, or 0.005). 
Type II error 𝛽 It quantifies the false negative rate. Given that the alternative hypothesis was true, 
what is the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Journey to hypothesis testing 
“Throughout the 19th century, testing was carried out rather informally without a prespecified 
rejection level. It was roughly equivalent to calculating an (approximate) p value and rejecting the 
hypothesis if this value appeared to be sufficiently small” [31]. The formalization of the P-value 
 9 
 
and the introduction of the significance level came during the early 20th century, by a pair of great 
rivals, Karl Pearson (after whom Pearson correlation was named) and Ronald Fisher (the father of 
modern statistics). Pearson calculated the P-value (which he denoted as capital P) by integration 
from a chi-square distribution during a chi-squared test [32]. Fisher coined 0.05 as “the 
significance level” in his book entitled Statistical methods for research workers [30] and used the 
term P-value in many of his own studies. Regarding setting the significance level at 0.05, Fisher 
stated that “the (critical) value for which P = .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2 (standard 
deviations); it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be 
considered significant or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation (under a standard 
normal distribution defined on 𝑅%) are thus formally regarded as significant.”  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. A comparison between the Fisher’s hypothesis test and the Newman-Pearson test, and how 
they constitute the null hypothesis significance test (NHST). Left: The Fisher’s test by R. A. Fisher. It 
contains five main steps, following the order clockwise. Compared to the Newman-Pearson test, the 
Fisher’s test is more flexible, suitable for ad hoc studies, inferential, but it does not have an alternative 
hypothesis nor performs power analysis. Right: The Newman-Person test by Jerzy Neyman and Egon 
Pearson. It consists of eight main steps, following the order clockwise, where the first six steps are done a 
priori, and the last two steps a posteriori. Compared to Fisher’s test, it is more powerful, deductive, suitable 
for repeated sampling studies, but is less flexible. The null hypothesis significance test is a hybrid of the 
two; it follows the NP-test procedurally and Fisher philosophically [33–37]. Specifically, its mandatory steps 
consist of the steps highlighted in orange in the NP test, with the main hypothesis 𝐻( replaced by 𝐻), and 
the P-value calculation and significance assessment from the Fisher’s test (highlighted in blue) added.  
 
To better understand P-value-based decision making, it is beneficial to distinguish three 
types of hypothesis-tests: The Fisher test, the Neyman-Pearson test, and the null hypothesis 
significance test, from which the P-value is generally derived. We will sail into the sea of Bayesian 
evidence in a later section; readers interested in statistical decision theory can also refer to Wald’s 
decision functions [38]. 
Fisher developed the Fisher test (or the test of significance); Egon Pearson (Karl Pearson’s 
son) and Jerzy Neyman designed the Neyman-Pearson (NP) test (or the test of statistical 
hypotheses) [39]. The Fisher test contains the following procedures: (F1) selecting a test; (F2) 
Select a 
suitable 
test
Set up !"
Calculate 
the P-value
Assess the 
statistical 
significance
Interpret 
findings
Estimate 
expected 
effect size
Select an 
optimal 
test
Set up !#
Set up !$
Calculate 
sample 
size for 
good 
power
Calculate 
the critical 
value
Calculate 
the test-
statistic
Decide 
whether 
in favor of !# or !$
More flexible 
No alternative 
hypothesis
Suitable for 
ad hoc studies
No 
power analysis
Inferential 
More powerful DeductiveLess flexible
Suitable for 
repeated 
sampling studies
 10 
 
setting up the null hypothesis; (F3) calculating the P-value; (F4) assessing statistical significance; 
(F5) interpreting the results [30,33,40–42]. The NP test consists of the following steps: (NP1) 
Setting up the expected effect size; (NP2) selecting an optimal test; (NP3) setting up the main 
hypothesis (similar to Fisher’s null hypothesis); (NP4) setting up the alternative (research) 
hypothesis (this is a major difference from the Fisher’s test); (NP5) calculating the sample size 
required for good power (this is another major difference from the Fisher’s test); (NP6) calculating 
the critical value (see Table 1) for the test; (NP7) calculating the test-statistic for the research; 
(NP8) deciding whether to reject the main hypothesis or not [33,39,43]. The null hypothesis 
significance test (NHST), first coined by Everett Lindquist [44], is a hybrid of the two tests: it 
follows the NP test procedurally and Fisher philosophically [33–37]. It is the main practice of 
hypothesis testing in scientific explorations today, including biological studies [45], education 
[46], psychology [47,48], social sciences [49], and has been adopted by textbook writers, journal 
editors, and publishers [37,47], with which we build our discussion (see Fig. 2).  
A helpful way to understand the logic flows of the P-value based hypothesis tests and 
decision-making is to view it from the point of the three-world system (i.e., the physical world, the 
Platonic mathematical world, and the mental world) described by Roger Penrose in The Road to 
Reality. In our slight modification of it, the physical world represents the entire universe (from 
chemical compounds to human populations) and contains properties that are not readily accessible 
(e.g., the prevalence of a disease in the entire world). Yet, these properties can be described using 
mathematical principles (left arrow in Fig. 1 a) [50]. The mathematical principles can be 
understood by mental faculty (right arrow in Fig. 1 a) and form one’s perspective about the 
physical world (bottom arrow in Fig. 1 a). In the triad system (which links population, sample, and 
the P-value, as illustrated in Fig. 1 b), a population (e.g., a group of individuals) contains some 
unknown property (e.g., the prevalence of a disease in a large population), which is governed by 
some mathematical principle but is difficult to outline explicitly (as one cannot assess every 
individual in a population). One way to circumvent this is to first simplify the problem as a 
hypothetical statement about the property (for example, that the prevalence is 20%) and then draw 
a sample from the population and test, using a statistical model, whether there is evidence from 
the sample supporting the hypothesis (left arrow in Fig. 1 b). The test produces a P-value (right 
arrow in Fig. 1 b), with which one assigns a probabilistic belief about the population (bottom arrow 
in Fig. 1 b) and from which one concludes whether to reject the hypothesis.  
Although convenient to extract knowledge about the unknown world in mathematical and 
logical formulations, and to make inference about the world using inductive reasoning, these 
systems are however not without flaws. In the three-world system, (a) there may be “physical 
action beyond the scope of mathematical control”, (b) there exist “true mathematical assertions 
whose truth is in principle inaccessible to reason and insight”; and, thus, (c) the mental 
understanding about the physical world via mathematical formulations may be inconsistent with 
the truth from the physical world. In the triad of population, sample, and the P-value, (i) it may be 
possible that the sample property does not well represent the population property; (ii) the unknown 
property of the population may not be well established using a statistical argument (e.g., a test 
done on a sample whose distribution violates the assumption of the test); and, thus, (iii) the P-
value and the belief attached to it (to make any statement about the population property) via a 
hypothesis test may be inconsistent with the true (but unknown) population property.  
 
 
 
 11 
 
The Roles of the P-value in Scientific Enquires 
In its three-century long history, the P-value has been of great interest to statisticians, 
biological and medical scientists, clinicians, and philosophers. There are certainly criticisms, as 
extreme as “… it does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to know what we 
want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does” [15]. We will discuss 
the limitations of the P-value in the next section. Here, we will look at the roles of the P-value. 
Chief to decision making, hypothesis testing and P-values form an information extraction 
system that derives evidence from a sample that may throw probable light on the population at a 
continuous scale (see 1 and 2 below); additionally, when multiple studies are used to address a 
common question, they configurate an information pooling system that compares and combines 
evidence obtained from multiple datasets (see 3 below). 
 
Fig. 3. A roadmap of key usefulness of P-value discussed in this paper. From left to right: (1) It 
underpins a clear decision-making system that is convenient to and accepted by a broad scientific, clinic, 
and medical communities. (2) It provides a common, and simple rule that guides multiple experimenters to 
evaluate and compare individual findings based on respective P-values and a pre-agreed significance level. 
(3) It evaluates the outcomes of a test on a continuous scale. (4) It helps integrating results from multiple 
studies and datasets. (5) It facilitates causal enquires and provides a metric to evaluate and determine the 
existence and strength of potential causation that can be used during estimation of causal effect, cross-
validation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical causal reasoning, cause alteration, and the method 
of instrumental variables (see next section and Fig. 4 for more details).   
 
Among those who have thought about and commented on the usefulness of the P-value are 
some of the towering geniuses of statistical sciences - Peter Bickel, Roger Berger, George Casella, 
Kjell Doksum, Larry Hedges, Ingram Olkin, Richard Oosterhoff, and Willem van Zwet – to name 
only a few. In their writings, there seems to be an agreement that the P-value makes the 
interpretation of evidence more convenient, ties the knots between results from different studies 
and data sets, and makes discoveries from various studies comparable to one another (also see Fig. 
3). More specifically: 
 
1. “Different individuals faced with the same testing problem may have different 
criteria of size (see effect size in Table 1, our insertion). Experimenter I may be satisfied to reject 
the hypothesis H using a test with size 0.05, whereas experimenter II insists on using 0.01. It is 
then possible that experimenter I rejects H, whereas experimenter II accepts H on the basis of the 
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same outcome of an experiment. If the two experimenters can agree on a common test statistic, 
this difficulty may be overcome by reporting the outcome of the experiment in terms of the P-
value.” (see [51], p. 221). 
 
2.  “… the smaller the P-value, the stronger the evidence for rejecting the null 
hypothesis. Hence, a P-value reports the results of a test on a more continuous scale, rather than 
just the dichotomous decision ‘Accept the null hypothesis’ or ‘Reject the null hypothesis’” (See 
[52], p 397).  
 
3. When different experiments produce various types of data, the P-value can combine 
the evidence relating to a given hypothesis [53]. This is the basis for ‘data fusion’ and meta-
analysis [54] (see below for further discussion).  
 
To summarize, the P-value makes three important contributions to scientific studies. They 
are: (1) comparing and bridging decision-making outcomes regarding the same testing problem 
done on different studies and datasets; (2) supporting evidence at a continuous scale (rather than 
binary conclusions); and (3) integrating results from multiple studies and datasets. 
 
The P-value in Causal Inference 
Aristotle said, “We do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why; that 
is to say, its cause.” A central contribution hypothesis testing and the P-value make to scientific 
studies is that they facilitate causal enquiries about the relationship between variables of scientific 
interest in space, time, between groups, and across individuals. 
We begin by summarizing the contributions the P-value makes to causal studies in five 
areas: estimation of causal effect, cross-validation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical 
causal reasoning, cause alteration, and the method of instrumental variables (IV).  
The applications of causal inference may differ from one subject to another, but the general 
roles of the P-value enumerated above suggest that there is a common theme in hypothesis testing 
which one can glimpse into by focusing on one subject. We choose to give examples in brain 
studies below, about which we know slightly more; we do not imply that, over and above these 
rules, there are no additional contributions the P-value can make to causal inference in other 
subjects, such as clinical trials. But if there are, it would be tremendously difficult to list every 
departure or derivative of it. We hope that our discussion below may stir further enquiries and that 
our ever-increasing knowledge in statistical and biological sciences will one day allow us to 
formulate more general and comprehensive rules of the P-value in causal studies. 
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Fig. 4. Hypothesis based causal enquiries in scientific studies. (a) Estimation of causal effect. The 
average causal effect (of the drug effect) in a randomized study can be identified and estimated using the 
difference between the expected outcome of treatment group and of the control group, and subsequently 
examined via a P-value. (b) Out-of-sample test and re-test. The model performance or the causal effect 
estimated from one dataset, if not validated, may be exaggerated or overfit the dataset. Out-of-sample 
testing can, to a certain degree, alleviate over-fitting by training the model using a subset of the data (left) 
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and testing it in the remaining, previously unseen, data (middle). Additional testing using data from another 
study or demographic distinctive sample may further support the generalization of the trained model and 
its suggested causal claims (right). P-value is useful to evaluate whether the tests are successful, thereby 
guarding their validity and efficacy. (c) Graphical causal reasoning. The directed arrows (called edges) 
indicate potential causation. The figure gives an example of directed causal flows in the brain when 
performing object recognition. Particularly, when one views an object, areas in the visual cortex including 
V1, V3, and V4 first receive inputs from pulvinar nucleus (PN) and lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) (left 
figure). Subsequently, V1 sends signals to V3 (which processes object recognition) and V4 (which 
processes color recognition), and through V3, sends information to the prefrontal cortex (middle figure). 
Finally, there are reverse feedbacks from V3 and V4 to V1 (right figure). (d) Causal alternation. If altering 
the cause (while maintaining other covariates unchanged) results in changes in the outcomes, then it 
suggests that the stimuli cause the change in outcomes. The figure gives an example of deep brain 
stimulation (DBS), where applying DBS to a target brain region, the brain patterns of the area change 
accordingly, which then modifies (behavioural) symptoms. DBS is used in treating severe Parkinson’s 
disease.  (e) The method of instrumental variables (IV). When directly altering causes or randomization 
is unavailable, one can consider the method of IV. In the figure, one is interested in studying whether head 
injury causes risky behaviour. On the one hand, randomization or assigning head injury is impossible; on 
the other hand, it could be argued that a reverse causation, where risky behaviour causes head injury, is 
also possible. By using an IV, wearing a helmet, one can then study whether head injury causes risky 
behaviour. Suppose one assumes that wearing a helmet is unlikely to cause risky behaviour (In the long 
term or something, obviously will on the dat), and it is likely to reduce head injury. Then, if introducing 
wearing helmets reduces risky behaviour (while all other variables such as age and gender are controlled 
for), then it suggests that wearing helmets reduces head injury, which reduces risky behaviour.  
 
The first P-value based causal enquiry is the estimation of causal effect (see Fig. 4 (a)). 
Suppose that a researcher is interested in studying whether a Levodopa-based drug is effective in 
treating Parkinson’s disease (PD). Critically, they need to compare the symptoms of a PD patient 
after taking the drug to that of the same (our emphasis) patient after not taking the drug. Only one 
of the two is observable (namely a subject S is either going to take a drug or a placebo but not 
both) and within-subject designs are not suitable due to carry-over effects (in other words, although 
it is possible that subject S takes both drug and a placebo, the causal argument may be weakened 
if there were an (carry-over) effect from the former to the latter. A special case of randomization 
is a matched pair study where two groups, a treatment group and a placebo group are randomized 
to receive either a medication or a placebo [55]. Using randomization (when randomization is not 
available, see Propensity Score Matching (PSM)1), the Neyman–Rubin causal model (also known 
 
1 There are times when randomization becomes impossible. For example, it is unethical to assign a group of 45-year-old heathy subjects 
to take a new Levodopa-based drug to investigate whether the drug reduces one’s PD symptoms at 50. Additionally, it is likely that there is another 
source, say, the socioeconomic status (which may be related to the affordability of new drugs) or genetics (if there is a family history of PD, one 
may be more willing to take the drug), that is both associated with taking the drug and developing PD at 50. Similarly, it would be difficult to 
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as the potential outcomes framework) shows that the average causal effect can be identified and 
estimated using the difference between the expected outcome of treatment group and the expected 
outcome of the control group (note that without randomization, one cannot derive causal properties 
from two groups consisting of different individuals) [56–58]. By evaluating the P-value, a 
hypothesis test can then examine whether, and, if so, to what extent, the drug effect from the 
treatment group is more significant than that of the control group. 
The second P-value based causal enquiry is out-of-sample testing. In other words, the P-
value is useful to verify whether evidence (e.g., hypothesis testing conclusions and model 
performance) discovered in a (training) sample can be extrapolated in another (testing) sample (see 
Fig. 4 (b)). For example, if one is interested in developing a model to select neural markers that 
can predict the severity of a brain disease (say Parkinson’s disease), one can first fit the model on 
brain data obtained from a training sample (for example, using brain data of 70 people from an 
entire set of 100 people) – this is called model development. Subsequently, one can test the 
parameters of the trained model (for example, the weights of selected neural markers) on the 
remaining data (i.e., brain data from the remaining 30 subjects) to check whether the markers can 
predict the severity of Parkinson’s disease in new subjects, without further modelling [59]. The 
efficacy of the selected neural markers can be evaluated by comparing how well the predictions 
are made using a distance measure (e.g., Pearson correlation) and its P-value. If significant, one 
can say that the model fitted on the training set is reproducible with regards to the test set. 
Additionally, the P-value can be used to test whether model trained (and results obtained) from 
one study (including within-study training and testing) can be extrapolated to (and reproduced in) 
another dataset or study [60,61]2. 
The third P-value based causal enquiry is graphical causal reasoning3. It uses graphical 
models to study how activities from brain region A may be causing those from region B (see Fig. 
4 (c)) [62–64]. The P-value comes firmly in the graphical pursuit; it can be used to evaluate 
whether a significant link (called a directed edge) exists from A to B (or from B to A) by judging 
whether the edge strength is significantly different from zero using hypothesis testing4. 
 
estimate the effect of taking the drug on reducing PD symptoms by comparing the PD symptoms of an individual at 50 who had taken the drug 
with his or her PD symptoms at 50 had he or she not taken the drug. To solve these issues, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimates the treatment 
effect by comparing the outcomes of the subjects under treatment (e.g., taking the drug) with those of a different set of “matched” subjects without 
treatment (e.g., having not taken the drug) [103–106]. More concretely, one could first compute the propensity score of A taking the drug based on 
his or her gender, economic, social, genetic, and demographic backgrounds, and choose an individual from a group of 50-year-old who had not 
taken the drug but has a propensity score (of taking the drug during his or her younger years) closest to A’s. Then we can compare the PD symptoms 
between these two individuals and estimate the effect of taking the drug on reducing PD symptoms at age 50.  
2 Strictly speaking, neither types of out-of-sample testing test causation; an out-of-sample study endorsed by P-value, however, reduces 
the likelihood of model overfitting. Although an overfit model suggests nothing about causation (but about association), a reproduceable model 
does offer stronger evidence of association, and suggests that the association relationship may be more likely to be causal. In short, out-of-
sample testing yields more rigorous statistical claims about model performance, and about potential causal relationships between variables 
under investigation. Overall, when significant results are discovered from an experiment, it is useful to repeat the experiment to verify if the 
result can be replicated or reproduced [107]. 
 
3 Its modern development is based on Reichenbach’s macrostatistical theory [108] and Suppes’ probabilistic theory [109] (Interested 
readers could refer to the books edited by Sosa and Tooley for a thorough review [110,111]).  
4 Although graphical causal reasoning (along with out-of-sample testing) provides causal explanation on neurobiological problems, the 
discovery, rigorously speaking, are still that of association in nature. For example, using graphical causal reasoning may show that the fact that 
activations in area A cause activations in area B may be due to both areas receiving inputs from the same region area C, and hence it is activities in 
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The fourth P-value based causal enquiry is causal alteration. It examines if a modification 
of a hypothesised cause (while fixing other potential causes unaltered) results in a change of the 
hypothesised effect (see Fig. 4 (d)). For example, via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
one can use a magnetic field generator (or coil) to generate electric current, which modifies the 
magnetic field of a specific group of neurons in a small surface region of the brain [65,66]. When 
confounds are controlled, a hypothesis test can be performed to examine whether there is a 
significant difference between the outcomes (human behaviour or brain patterns of a region into 
which these neurons feed) when these neurons are “on” with the outcomes when they are “off”, 
and conclude based on the P-value whether these neurons are responsible for the outcome change. 
When a direct manipulation of the cause is impractical, the method of instrumental 
variable (IV)5, the fifth P-value based causal enquiry, may be useful (see Fig. 4 (e)) [67]. For 
example, head injury for rugby players may cause behaviour, emotion, and sensory changes (such 
as developing risky behaviour, becoming irritable and angry, and having trouble with balance). A 
significant correlation between the severity of head injuries and changes in behavior, emotion, and 
sensation, however, does not suggest the former causes the latter. On the contrary, having risky 
behaviour and being irritable and angry may result in fights between players whereas having a 
poor sense of balance may cause falling, both of which may result in head injuries. Furthermore, 
head injury may first affect another variable, such as the development of depression, which then 
affect the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes. One certainly cannot randomize individuals 
to receive a head injury or not, but could relatively easily introduce an additional variable, so-
called instrumental variable (or IV), which affects the chance of having a head injury, but has no 
independent effect on the outcome (i.e., the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes). An IV here 
is wearing helmets (in Rugby Union, players usually do not wear helmets), which is mostly likely 
to reduce the change of having a head injury but does not directly affect the outcomes. If, after 
introducing the helmet, the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes become insignificant, one 
can conclude with more confidence that head injuries are the cause for changes. The P-value is 
essential in evaluating the effect size, strength, and order of causal effect regarding the IV and the 
effect.   
 
The Paradoxes and Misuses of the P-value 
The employment of the P-value and significance value 𝛼 in decision-making has never ceased to 
receive criticisms. Ten critics may, however, offer twenty different reasons why the P-value should 
be replaced or banned. There are nevertheless some common paradoxes, misuses, and 
misinterpretations that run through the history of the P-value, from its earliest days to the present 
time.  
Statistical, biological, clinical, and medical scientists conducting hypothesis tests hope to 
learn knowledge from a sample (of size N) of data to infer (by comparing the P-value and the 
significance level 𝛼) about properties of the population (see Fig. 1). Although protective devices 
(such as randomized sampling, and large sample theory) can reduce the odds of making errors, 
different sample sizes, P-values, and significance levels may challenge the consistency in 
decisions across studies. Although we have demonstrated how P-values facilitate scientific 
 
C that is the true cause. The P-value is nevertheless useful to assist unveiling potential causal relationships, which can be further improved by 
conducting additionally analyse.    
 
5 A suitable instrumental variable (IV) is one that is correlated with an endogenous explanatory variable, such as severity of head injury, but 
is not correlated with the error term (for example, in a regression). An endogenous explanatory variable is a covariate that is correlated with the 
error term. 
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enquires and causal analysis (see Figs. 3 and 4), its roles would be optimized if one can clarify its 
association with sample sizes and significance level with regards to decision-making. The first half 
of this section inquires into the relationships between three chief properties, the 𝑃-value, sample 
size, and significance level, in hypothesis testing and decision-making, and highlights that the 
interpretation of P-values is contextual while conducting hypothesis testing. Next, we highlight 
the misuses and misinterpretations of P-value in scientific studies and offer our modest 
recommendations to avoid them. We hope that our summary and suggestions, by no means 
exhaustive, may improve the application of the P-value and engender consistent and reproducible 
scientific discoveries.  
 
The Paradoxes of the P-value 
Recall the example earlier where a clinician wanted to test whether the prevalence of a disorder 
was 10%. To do so, the clinician selected a sample of ten individuals, found two out the ten had 
the disease, and used evidence from the sample (20% sample incident rate) to make inference 
about the population prevalence. With P = 0.26, the hypothesis was not rejected.  
The first paradox is that a larger sample size yields a smaller P-value; decisions made one 
the same effect size may therefore be inconsistent. For example, suppose we increased the sample 
size from 10 to 50, of which 10 had the disorder (so the sample incident rate remained at 20%). 
This yielded a P-value of 0.02. Although the new sample had the same (20%) incident rate, the 
null hypothesis was rejected under a significance level of 0.05 with a larger sample. This test, 
however, would still survive under a significance level of 0.005 (as recommended by [20,21]). 
Now consider an even larger sample of 100, of which 20 had the disease (again the sample incident 
rate was 20%), the P-value was now 0.002, and the hypothesis, even with the more stringent 
significance level of 0.005, was rejected.  
Generally, as we see from Fig. 5, the P-value decreases monotonically as the sample size 
increases. Thus, a hypothetically aggressive scientist may attempt to “hack” the P-value by adding 
more subjects to the study or repeating significance tests (not for better science but for a smaller 
P). It is thus preferable to consider both sample size and effect size during experimental plans. For 
example, in clinical trials, a Phase II study is first done to determine an effect size, and this 
information is then used to design a Phase III study with a sample large enough to confirm the 
observations from the phase II study. Indeed, most clinicians prefer clinical trials with very large 
sample sizes, as they feel larger sample studies are more reliable than smaller trials; with a large 
sample size, one can then look at the effect size and try to decide if this is good news for patients 
or not. Thus, first, we do not object lowering the significance level (for example, to 0.005), as it 
may help reduce the rate of falsely significant discoveries [21]. For example, while most clinicians 
will be confronted with clinical trials where one clear primary outcome is defined, in genome-wide 
association studies (GWAS), the standard threshold has been set much lower than 0.005 (𝑃 <5 × 10,/) to control for the number of false-positive associations [68,69]. Second, we do not 
advocate against large-sample studies (which have many advantages as we see below); rather, we 
argue that one should treat the P-value contextually and avoid being that aggressive scientist (see 
suggested guidelines in Table 2 and Figure 6).  
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Fig. 5. The paradoxes of the P-value. (a)  The associations between P-value, the sample size, and the 
significance level. The figure shows that the P-value goes down as the sample sizes increases in the 
binomial experiment given in the text. The paradox lies in that, given a particular significance level (say 
0.05), one can increase the size of sample to obtain a P-value that is significant. (b) Even if the significance 
level is lowered (to, say, 0.005), one could keep increasing the sample size to obtain a significant P-value 
compared to the new significance level. On the other hand, with fixed sample size, one may adjust the 
significance level to “control” whether the result is significant or not. (c) The paradox between the P-value, 
the sample size, and statistical power. A larger sample size may yield a more significant P-value with a 
small effect size, but it also increases power. (d) Meanwhile, reducing the significance level (say from 0.05 
to 0.005) may produce more conservative testing results, but it reduces power. Figs. (a)-(d) give 
demonstrations, from two different perspectives, why the interpretation of the P-value needs to be 
contextual. 
 
The second paradox arises because of the relationship between sample-size, the P-value, 
and power. Statistical power quantifies the true positive rate, which equals to one minus the type 
II error (or 1 − 𝛽) (see Fig. 1 c). In other words, the power measures the ability of a hypothesis 
test to reject the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. To see the paradox, let’s 
return to the binomial example. Although a hypothetically aggressive scientist can always “hack” 
a hypothesis test by adding more subjects to the study however stringent a significance level is, it 
would be premature to say that collecting data from a large set of sample data is a bad practice, as 
a larger sample size provides more statistical power. More concretely, consider a null hypothesis 
where the prevalence of the disease is 10% against an alternative hypothesis where the prevalence 
is 20%. Under the same significance level (say at 0.05), the type II error decreases as sample size 
goes up; as a result, the power increases. On the other hand, an enquiry into the relationship 
between the significance level and the power shows that a stringent significance level is not always 
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beneficial: comparing Fig. 5 (c) with Fig. 5 (d), a test with a more stringent significance level 
yields less power, and this is true for every sample size.  
Taken together, although the incidences in three samples (𝑛 = 10, 50, and 100) were the 
same, namely 20%, the hypothesis testing results were different. In other words, for each (lower) 
significance level, when the sample incidence rate was relatively stable, it was possible to obtain 
a significant P-value by increasing the sample size, thereby “hacking” the test.  
Thus, on the one hand, the interpretation of a P-value needs to be contextual. On the other 
hand, when designing experiments and conducting hypothesis testing, there is a compromise to 
make, one that considers balancing the sample size, significance level, and power. 
 
To summarize, these two examples demonstrate that: 
 
(i) The P-value based hypothesis testing is sample-size dependent. 
(ii) Lowering the threshold alone may make rejecting a null hypothesis more difficult, but 
one may increase the sample size to “hack” the P-value. 
(iii) A larger sample size may yield a more significant (but not meaningful in certain 
context) P-value, but it also increases power. Meanwhile, reducing the significance level (say from 
0.05 to 0.005) may produce more conservative testing results, but reduces power.  
(iv) The interpretation of the P-value needs to be contextual, accounting for not only the 
scientific problem in question but also the experimental design and the sample size, significance 
level, and the desired power.  
 
The P-value and Multidimensional Data: A Love-hate Relationship  
Anyone performing data analysis today cannot fail to be impressed by the size of the data. 
Containing a wealth of information, large-scale data provide a bigger platform to make scientific 
enquiries, and, properly treated, may produce more consistent conclusions [70]. We have discussed 
above how a large sample size may lower the P-value, and how it could increase power; there are 
a few additional issues that arise with large-scale data. 
First, “big data” may introduce “big errors”. Large-scale data such as magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) data are contaminated with noise. For example, in fMRI data, multiples sources of 
noise can corrupt the true signals, such as scanner-related noise including thermal noise and 
scanner instability noise, noise due to head motion and physiology, HRF model errors, and noise 
due to different sites [70]. It is thus necessary to reduce the amount of noise and to extract 
meaningful (e.g., with high signal-to-noise ratio) information from the data prior to hypothesis 
testing. Practically, although a geneticist with a plausible hypothesis about the involvement of a 
gene in a certain disease may still be in favour of a standard significance level,  geneticists who 
consider a massive number of comparisons have begun to require replication of study findings via 
cross-site and cross-study platforms (see also meta-analysis below) and impose very strict 
significance level (𝑃 < 5 × 10,/) [68,69]. Even with extensive replication and very strong 
signals, however, one may still observe false discoveries due to confounding variables or other 
biases from large-scale studies [71]. Therefore, while continuing to design more stringent test 
pipelines (such as in Fig. 6), integrating, and reproducing evidences, it is important to improve 
critical statistical thinking, teaching, and interdisciplinary training [26]. 
The other problem with large-scale data is the increasing occurrence of spurious findings. 
Consider a hypothesis testing to investigate the relationships between functional connectivity of 
500 brain regions of interest (ROI) and individual creativity. 500 edges (where an edge indicates 
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the correlation between signals obtained from two regions) are obtained from 100 individuals. 
Simultaneously, a creativity score is obtained from each individual, yielding 100 scores measuring 
the overall creativity. Due to the large dimensionality of the regions, it is very likely that a few 
irrelevant edges are spuriously associated with the 100 creativity scores [72]. This may introduce 
an erroneous scientific discovery that brain regions associated with these edges are the biological 
underpinnings for creativity, and multiple hypotheses need to be accounted for when interpreting 
the associated P-values. 
The third problem derives from the relationship between a small effect size with a 
significant P-value. “In psychological and sociological investigations involving very large 
numbers of subjects, it is regularly found that almost all correlations or differences between means 
are statistically significant” [73]. Empirically, high-dimensional data with a large sample size may 
yield an effect size that is extremely small but accompanied by a significant P-value. For example, 
correlation of 0.1 in a sample of 500 has a P-value around 0.025; a correlation of 0.01 in a sample 
of 100,000 has a P-value around 0.002. Despite being significant (the former being significant 
compared to 0.05 and the latter significant compare to 0.005), the P-values in these cases may 
offer little inference. In clinical trials and pathological studies, a small but significant effect size 
may not only offer little clinical inference, but also be difficult to interpret and reproduce [74].  
 
The Misuses of the P-value and Potential Remedies 
One way to look at the P-value based hypothesis testing is that it is a decision-making mechanism 
through which one studies a sample, obtains a probability, and assigns (subjective) belief to make 
(inductive) inference about an unobserved population under a pre-determined significance level. 
Such a mechanism has simplified decision-making and advanced biological, clinic, medical, and 
statistical research since its beginning and is increasingly protected by advanced measures; it is 
however not invulnerable to misuses.  
We have given above a few examples to highlight the importance that the interpretation of 
the P-value should be contextual. In the following, we will summarize some common confusions, 
misinterpretations, and misuses of the P-value. To begin, let us ask ourselves the following 
questions: 
 
(i) Must scientific conclusions be solely based on whether a P-value is less than a 
specific threshold? Are all post hoc scientific interpretation based on the P-value 
justified?  
(ii) How could we prevent “P-hacking”, for example, conducting several statistical 
tests and only report those that pass the threshold, or add subjects to existing studies 
to lower the P-value, in scientific discoveries?  
(iii) Many studies report results when observing a P-value smaller than 0.05 (or 0.005). 
But is 0.05 (or 0.005) an optimal benchmark?  
(iv) Does the P-value measure the probability that the research hypothesis is true? Or 
does P-value measure the probability that observed data is due to chance?  
(v) In the era of big data, does obtaining a very small P-value from hypothesis testing 
using a very large sample provide conclusive evidence about the result being 
significant?  
(vi) Last but not the least, must scientific discovery always be accompanied by 
hypothesis testing (and the P-value)? Are there alternative statistical approaches?  
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In Table 2, we attempt to answer these questions and present our modest recommendations, 
cautiously recognizing that it is difficult to offer complete remedies or definitive suggestions 
regarding a probabilistic, and contextual, system. Subsequently, we present a flowchart in Fig. 6 
as an example of how to make better use of the P-value in hypothesis testing based scientific 
discoveries. 
 
 
Misuses and misconceptions of 
the P-value 
 
Recommendations 
i. Scientific conclusions decisions are 
based only on whether a P-value is less 
than a specific threshold. 
Observing that a P-value is less than a threshold (e.g., 0.05) 
or not alone does not, and should not, endorse a binary scientific 
conclusion. This is particularly crucial when the P-value is close to the 
threshold. For example, neither a rejection of a null hypothesis when 
P=0.045, nor a failure to reject one when P=0.055, offer conclusive 
evidence regarding the null. P-value is contextual. Without further 
supporting evidence and analysis, it provides limited information. By 
further analysis, we refer to, but not restrict to, cross-validation, test-
retest (e.g., permutation and bootstrap tests), and out-of-sample 
extrapolation (see Figs. 2 and 4). By further evidence, it means that if 
reporting a P-value is mandatory (e.g., by a journal or a funding 
organization), reproducing a significant P-value is highly 
recommended. For example, if a significant P-value is discovered in a 
training sample, check if an independent testing sample also yields a 
significant P-value. If modelling is concerned, verify whether fitted 
parameters obtained from a discovery sample can be extrapolated to 
a previously unseen testing sample. Extrapolation here means 
applying a trained model to new testing subjects to confirm if it yields 
meaningful prediction [59], without further model fitting on the testing 
data. 
ii. “P-hacking” (e.g., conducting several 
statistical tests, and only report those 
that pass the threshold). 
Instead of “hacking” the P, (re)evaluate whether the 
experimental design is appropriate (e.g., is the design balanced? Is the 
sampling randomized?), if data collection is appropriate, the data 
processing is rigorous, the model is suitable, and all assumptions are 
met. If different experiments produce various types of data, conduct 
meta-analysis and use the P-value to combine evidence relating to a 
given hypothesis [54]. Finally, if multiple statistical tests are conducted 
on the same data, report all analyses and their P-values. 
iii. 0.05 is the benchmark for significance 
level. 
We cannot offer strong recommendation for a benchmark of 
a significance level. The number 0.05 is coined by Fisher for 
convenience6 (but see a recent call to use 0.005 [20,21]). In general, 
 
6 “The value for which P = 0.05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2; it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation 
ought to be considered significant or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation are thus formally regarded as significant. Using this 
criterion, we should be led to follow up a false indication only once in 22 trials, even if the statistics were the only guide available. Small effects 
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when data is too small to be split into a training set and a test set, use 
a conservative significance level for confirmative discovery (e.g., 0.05 
is more conservative than 0.1). Whenever possible, replicate the result 
in a novel sample. For large data that can be split into a training set 
and a test set, consider a conservative significance level (e.g., 0.005) 
for training, and a relatively more liberal one (e.g., 0.05) for out-of-
sample prediction. 
iv. P-value measures the probability that 
the research hypothesis is true. P-value 
measures the probability that observed 
data is due to chance." 
P-value makes a statement about whether observed data 
supports a hypothetical research explanation. It does not give a 
statement about the explanation. 
v. (a) I have a very large sample. 
(b) I have conducted hypothesis test and 
obtained a very small P-value. 
(c) Thus, the result must be significant. 
P-value is sensitive to sample size. A very large sample size 
with a very small effect size can yield a significant P-value. For 
example, a correlation of 0.1 in a sample of 500 yields a P-value around 
0.025; a correlation of 0.01 in a sample of 100,000 yields a P-value 
around 0.002. Such results may offer little inference in scientific 
studies, and are likely to be irreproducible [74]. When facing large 
sample sizes, data-driven approaches could be used instead (see vi 
below). If, however, a small but significant effect size is reproducible, 
the finding may still shed light on basic science, but it needs to be 
contextual (see i above). In biomedical studies, this would be indicated 
by a statistical statement, for example, “the difference was statistically 
significant”, and then an additional statement made on the clinical 
significance, using the effect size. 
vi. Scientific discovery must be 
accompanied by hypothesis testing (and 
P-value). 
There are alternative approaches. Depending on the specific 
scientific question, they are sometimes more suitable and feasible than 
hypothesis testing. For example, if scientists are more interested in 
estimating a parameter (e.g., mean activation) rather than testing a 
parameter (e.g., whether mean activation is different from zero), they 
can use confidence, credibility, or prediction intervals. If scientists have 
some prior knowledge about the problem, they could consider 
Bayesian methods. There are also alternative measures of evidence, 
such as likelihood ratio or Bayes Factor (see below). Finally, one could 
consider models based on decision theory and false discovery rates. 
 
Table 2. Common misinterpretation and misuse of P-values in science and recommendations 
[12,20,21,59,75,76] 
 
Making Better Use of the P: An Improved P(aradigm)   
Because of the paradoxes of P-values, it may be difficult at present to suggest a sample size, 
significance level, or power that would yield universal assent. We therefore instead suggest a 
procedure for conducting hypothesis testing aimed at improving reproducibility in scientific 
studies (see a pipeline in Fig. 6). We restrict our recommendation to studies that conduct (null) 
statistical hypothesis tests. We do not claim nor advocate that this is the only way to perform 
 
will still escape notice if the data are insufficiently numerous to bring them out, but no lowering of the standard of significance would meet this 
difficulty.” (see p 44 [30]). 
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statistical data analysis. Rather, the pipeline serves as an example where rigorous statistical 
thinking and analysis may reduce confounding effects, avoid over-fitting, and render reproducible 
research. We highlight that experimental design, data processing, and scientific interpretation are 
equally important, but are not shown in the figure or discussed in detail, as they are not the main 
focus of the article.  
We take a correlation test between two random variables (e.g., the edge strength between 
two brain regions over time) as an example. But the flowchart in Fig. 6 (b) can extend to other 
models or tests, for example, a test of a regression coefficient in a linear regression analysis. It can 
also extend to cases involving more than two variables.  
Together, we reiterate that the interpretation of the P-value is contextual. George Box said 
“Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to 
not be useful” 7 [77]. We need to interpret the P-value along with, but never independent of, the 
research (experimental) design, hypothesis, the model and its assumptions, and prior evidence. 
That it is contextual does not imply it is not rigorous. As shown in Fig. 6, even a seemingly simple 
correlation analysis requires extra caution to demonstrate (promising) causality. Improving 
statistical thinking and interdisciplinary training integrates statistical concepts and biological 
evidences, therefore, are equally important, critical, and urgent [26].  
 
             
 
 
7 Also known as “All models are wrong, but some are useful”. 
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Fig. 6. Making better use of the P-value. (a) A typical flowchart for conducting hypothesis-led testing on 
whether correlation between two random variables is significantly different from zero, using a threshold of 
0.05. A significant correlation, however, does not equate causation. Note that this framework forms the first 
part of the flowchart in figure (b). Figure (b) provides a more rigorous flowchart for making causal enquires. 
Note that the correlation test is used as an example; it could be replaced with other models or tests. It 
extends to cases where more than two variables are concerned. For the purpose of demonstration, we 
focus mainly on testing linear causation, and abbreviate the procedure for testing non-linear causation 
(which is marked with two parallel bars in the figure) - interested readers can refer to [78,79]. We do not 
claim nor advocate that this is the only procedure to analyse data; rather, it serves as an example to remove 
confounding effects, avoid over-fitting, and conduct reproducible research. We emphasize that a careful 
experimental design, appropriate data processing, and contextual scientific interpretation are equally 
important, but are not shown in the figure. The illustration demonstrates that even simple analysis needs 
additional caution when causal inference and reproducibility are concerned.  
 
 
Hypothesis Test in the Bayesian Realm 
An alternative way to gather evidence is to use the posterior probability of 𝐻! given data 𝑥 through 
the Bayesian lenses [13,14,80–85].  
We provide a simple example below for interested readers to distinguish the key difference 
between the Bayesian posterior evidence and the P-value; others may skip to the section comparing 
the two approaches.  
 
The Bayesian Posterior Evidence 
Suppose one observes data 𝑋 = 𝑥, where 𝑋	~	𝑓(𝑥 − 𝜃), and (a) 𝑓(∙) is symmetric about zero; (b) 𝑓(𝑥 − 𝜃) has monotone likelihood ratio; (c) there is some prior information (or 𝜋(𝜃)) for the 
location parameter 𝜃. Consider the following hypothesis test: 
 𝐻!:	𝜃 ≤ 0	 versus  𝐻%:	𝜃 > 0.               (2) 
 
The Bayesian posterior evidence, written as 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥), for (2) above is 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥) =𝑃(𝜃 ≤ 0|𝑥) = ∫ 1($,))45())#*+∫ 1($,))45())+*+ . The corresponding P-value, using Equation (1), is 𝑠𝑢𝑝)6!		𝑃(𝑋	 ≥𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡8$ . Evidently, 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥) does not necessarily offer equivalent evidence as the P-
value. Unfortunately, 
 
“… most nonspecialists interpret 𝒑 precisely as 𝑷(𝑯𝟎|𝒙) (see [80]) [thereby committing the 
fallacy of the transposed conditional, our insertion], which only compounds the problem” [14]. 
 
Bayesian Posterior Evidence vs. the P-value 
Naturally, one would ask which is more suitable in scientific studies? A definitive answer is 
difficult; but it turns out that the Bayesian evidence 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥) and the P-value are not mutually 
exclusive: there are situations where these two are equivalent and others where the two offer 
different insights about the null. Thus, it is helpful for a practitioner to distinguish between them 
when deciding which to choose. Since one- and two- sided hypothesis tests are the predominate 
practices in scientific and clinic expositions, we will focus on these two types of tests in the 
following. Readers who are interested in composite hypothesis tests could refer to [81,82]. 
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1. [For a two-sided (point null) test]: The P-value tends to overstate the evidence against 
the null [14,83,84]; that is, the P-value is smaller than the Bayesian posterior evidence. 
2.a [For a one-sided test]: The P-value can be approximately equal to the Bayesian 
posterior evidence [86]. 
2.b [For a one-sided test]: One can construct a (improper) prior such that the P-value and 
the Bayesian posterior evidence match [87]. 
3.a [For a one-sided test]: For data following a distribution with monotone likelihood ratio, 
and that has unimodal density, symmetric about zero, or is normal (0, 𝜎.), where 0 < 𝜎. <∞, the P-value is equal to inf 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥), where the infimum is take over a class of priors 
[13].  
3.b [For a one-sided test]: For other distributions, the P-value is greater than or equal to inf 𝑃(𝐻!|𝑥), suggesting that the P-value may be understating the evidence against the null 
[13]. 
4. If prior mass is concentrated at a point (or in a small interval) and the remainder is 
allowed to vary over the alternative hypothesis 𝐻% (in other words one has strong prior 
information), then there could be (noticeable) discrepancy between the Bayesian posterior 
evidence and the P-value. To see this, recall the hypothesis test in (2). Suppose there is 
some prior information about the location parameter 𝜃: 𝜋(𝜃) = 𝜋!ℎ(𝜃) + (1 − 𝜋!)𝑔(𝜃). 
This is equivalent to putting a prior 𝜋! to 𝜃 = 0 and another (1 − 𝜋!)𝑔(𝜃) to 𝜃 > 0, 
assigning mass on the point null hypothesis, thereby biasing the prior in favour of 𝐻! (for 
any fixed 𝑔) [13]. 
 
Taken together: 
 
(i) For a two-sided test (e.g., testing whether the disease prevalence is above or below 
20%), the conclusions made using Bayesian evidence may be more conservative 
than using the P-value [14,83,84].  
(ii) For a one-sided test (e.g., testing whether the disease prevalence is above 20%), 
the two offer approximately the same evidence (and can be constructed to be 
equivalent) [86,87].  
(iii) When one has strong prior information (say about the null hypothesis), the 
Bayesian alternative would favour the null [13]. It is particularly attractive, for 
example, when one conducts region fine mapping to identify the true causal 
variant(s) [88].  
(iv) When samples are large, the small P-values (see discussions above and Fig. 5) 
almost systematically reject the null; the Bayesian alternative does not [89].  
(v) One should be cautiously aware that if different studies adopt different priors, it 
would be problematic to compare findings between studies [90]. 
 
An Example: The Bayes Factor in Model Comparison 
A useful application of Bayesian evidence in scientific studies can be found in model comparison. 
For example, an epidemiologist is interested in investigating whether the data suggest that the 
disease incident rate is at 20% (𝐻%), or at 10% (𝐻.). 
More concretely, suppose 𝐻% and 𝐻. are two hypothesized models parameterized by 𝜃% 
and 𝜃., respectively. The Bayes factor (see [89] for a comprehensive review), or K, is written as: 
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𝐾 = :($|<"):($|<,) = ∫:()"|<"):($|)",			<")4)"∫:(),|<,):($|),,	<,)4), = :(<"|$):(<,|$) × :(<,):(<")                   (3) 
 
where 𝑥 stands for the data, and 𝐻% and 𝐻. are two hypothesized models. Note that when the priors 𝑃(𝐻%) and 𝑃(𝐻.) are equal, the Bayes factor reduces to 𝐾 = :(<"|$):(<,|$), thus degenerating to a 
likelihood ratio test. 
In words, the Bayes factor, by the above formulation, compares how likely the data is 
generated from model 1 (𝐻%) as compared to model 2 (𝐻.); hence the larger the 𝐾, the stronger 
evidence the data supports 𝐻% over 𝐻.. To see it more concretely, suppose an epidemiologist 
wanted to test the prevalence of a certain type of disorder. The epidemiologist came up with six 
candidate models (𝐻%) to test against an alternative model which assumed the prevalence was at 
10% (namely 𝐻. considered a parameter 𝜃. = 0.10). The six candidate models considered their 
parameters as follows, (1) a uniform distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑈[0,1]; (2) 15%, or 𝜃% = 0.15; (3) 40%, 
or 𝜃% = 0.40; (4) 20%, or 𝜃% = 0.20 (which is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)); a 
normal distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑁(0.2, 0.01), which can be considered as the MLE plus a small noise; 
and (6) a normal distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑁(0.2, 0.1), which can be considered as the MLE 
contaminated by a large noise, say, due to sampling error.  
The epidemiologist considered a number of samples of sizes 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, and 
200. For comparison, suppose that the true incident rates were all at 20%; namely for each sample, 
there were, respectively, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, and 40 patients. Using Equation (3), the Bayes factors 
for each test are calculated and presented in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. An illustration of Bayes factors in model comparison. Consider an experiment comparing two 
models 𝐻% and 𝐻&. For simplicity, the sample incidence rate was fixed at 0.2, no matter of sample size (that 
is, 8 for a sample of 40, and 20 for a sample of 100). Figure (a) is the zoomed-in snapshot of the orange 
box in Figure (b). Figure (a) shows how Bayes factor changes when the sample size was smaller than 100; 
figure (b) shows how Bayes factor behaves when the sample size was larger than 100. The experiment 
considered six candidate models for 𝐻% with the prevalence parameterized as, respectively, (1) from a 
uniform distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑈[0,1]; (2) 15%, or 𝜃% = 0.15; (3) 40%, or 𝜃% = 0.40; (4) 20%, or 𝜃% = 0.20 (which 
is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)); from a normal distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑁(0.2, 0.01), which can be 
considered as the MLE plus a small noise; and (6) from a normal distribution or 𝜃%	~	𝑁(0.2, 0.1), which can 
be considered as the MLE contaminated by a large noise, say, due to sampling error. The alternative model 
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𝐻& had a parameter 𝜃& = 0.10. The 𝐻% whose hypothesized parameter equaled the sample incident yielded 
the largest Bayes factor. In other words, the maximum likelihood estimator or MLE (in this case 0.2) 
achieved the optimal Bayes factor. The results also showed that the farther a hypothesized parameter 
departed from the MLE (e.g., 𝜃% = 0.40 is farther from 0.2 than 𝜃% = 0.15), the smaller the Bayes factor (or 
evidence); this was true no matter of sample size but the larger the sample size, the stronger then evidence. 
When sample size was small, the model with 𝜃%	~	𝑁(0.2, 0.01) (namely the MLE plus some Gaussian noise 𝑁(0.2, 0.01) underperformed 𝜃% = 0.15, indicating the noise had contaminated the evidence. With a larger 
sample size, the former outperformed the latter, indicating the signals from large-scale data had overcome 
the noise. 
 
There are four messages we can draw from the simulation studies, from which one could 
peer into the general behavior of the Bayes factor.  
(a) When the hypothesis (in 𝐻%) is close to the truth (20%), the Bayes factor uniformly 
supports 𝐻% over 𝐻. (as the Bayes factor is larger than 1 no matter the sample size).  
(b) When the hypothesis (in 𝐻%) is far from the truth, the Bayes factor uniformly opposes 𝐻% over 𝐻. (as the Bayes factor is no larger than 1 no matter the sample size).  
(c) The larger the sample size, the stronger evidence Bayes factor provides for supporting 
(or opposing) 𝐻%. This is a major difference from the P-value, which uniformly decreases when 
sample size increases.  
(d) The Bayes factor accounts for prior information and uncertainties in the model. For 
example, when prior information about 𝜃% is close to the truth (20%), the Bayes factor strongly 
supports 𝐻%; when the prior is contaminated by some noise (as in 𝑁(0.2, 0.01) and 𝑁(0.2, 0.1)), 
the Bayes factor becomes smaller, and the more noise found in the prior the smaller the Bayes 
factor. When there is uncertainty (as in a uniform distribution), the small sample size would 
support 𝐻. (namely 𝜃. = 0.1); when sample size becomes sufficiently large, the Bayes factor 
detects from the data that it is increasingly unlikely that the data corresponds to a model (𝐻.) where 𝜃. = 0.1. 
 
The Analysis of Analyses: Meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis (analysis of analyses8) comes effectively and conveniently in the pursuit of 
integrating, and extracting evidence obtained from large-scale heterogenous datasets, overcoming 
reporting bias, and drawing reliable conclusions. By analysing of, and pooling multiple P-values 
from (see Fig. 3) heterogenous studies and datasets, meta-analysis integrates information, 
improves power, reduces bias of the estimators, and delivers more reproducible evidence (see [54] 
for a thorough overview of meta-analysis tools and see [91] for a review on meta-analysis in 
neuroimaging9). 
The advantages of using large-scale heterogeneous datasets is scientific studies are 
twofold: information accumulation and commonality extraction [70]. 
Information accumulation means that increasing the size of a dataset and combining 
different data sets not only expands the dimensionality of the data (in space (such as measuring 
more sample units), time (such as obtaining more repeated measurements), and sample size (such 
as increasing the number of subjects)) but also compound heterogeneous sample, disease, or task 
 
8 The term meta-analysis (analysis of analyses) was coined by American statistician Gene V. Glass in 1976 in an article entitled Primary, 
secondary, and meta-analysis of research published on Educational Researcher. 
 
9 Although imaging studies are currently one of the main forces that produce large-scale data, meta-analysis, however, is not restricted to 
them. 
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information, either of which a small-scale dataset or a single dataset may not be able to offer. As 
a result, P-values obtained from large-scale (or combined) datasets may more clearly highlight the 
difference between subpopulations (e.g., healthy versus disease, male versus female, individuals 
under various treatments or stimuli versus controls), and identify the pathological-, gender-, 
treatment-, and task-specific phenotypes. Repeated measurements on heterogeneous 
subpopulations can help to further delineate the longitudinal variability of the features, thereby 
improving disease diagnosis and treatment analysis over time, and paving the way for longitudinal 
disease prediction and progression monitoring [92–95].  
Commonality extraction refers to obtaining converging evidence from multiple studies and 
data sets. On the one hand, data sets obtained from different studies and experimental conditions 
contain heterogeneous, and meaningful signals (see above). On the other hand, they may be subject 
to different degrees of systematic bias due to different experimental designs (e.g., a complete 
factorial design versus a fractional factorial design [96]), noises (such as head motion [97]), 
measurement errors due to data aggregation under different paradigms, from different cites, on 
different dates, etc. [98], missing data [99], and reporting bias (for example, only positive results 
are reported or published [100]). Consequently, data analysis results reported from data sets 
obtained under different designs and conditions may provide different P-values, thereby 
generating different, sometimes opposite conclusions.  
Today, it is increasingly common to see studies considering, and balancing both 
information accumulation and commonality extraction. For example, a committee of researchers 
may organize several study groups conducting multiple experiments and gathering data at different 
locations under various conditions, a good practice that has already been adopted in clinical trials 
(multicentre studies), to seek for converging evidence that may address a common scientific 
question. Naturally, one would ask, what is a suitable approach to obtain evidence from aggregated 
studies and data sets? 
Chief to this pursuit is meta-analysis. Specifically, 
(1) Meta-analysis can integrate results from different studies. For example, Fisher's 
combined probability test can combine the P-values obtained from multiple studies and datasets 
(see Fig. 3). Additionally, it can combine measurements obtained from different studies and 
datasets. For example, via meta-analysis, mean activations from the same brain region across 
multiple studies are weighted according to the inverse variance (inverse variance weighting) – that 
is, the larger the variance in one study, the smaller the weight is assigned to the mean from that 
study – and then summed up over all studies.  
(2) Meta-analysis can reduce bias. For example, when regions of (prior) interest have more 
liberally thresholds than others (such as in large-scale neuroimaging studies,), the results are likely 
biased towards these regions. Seed-based d mapping (also known as the signed differential 
mapping (SDM)) [101,102] can meta-analyse functional and structural brain data across multiple 
large-scale (neuroimaging) studies10 to reduce bias and improve power.  
 
10 First, peak coordinates (e.g., the brain regions where the differences between healthy and disease are the highest) are combined with 
t-statistic maps (each t-statistic map can be plotted to the brain space where regions with large t values indicate activation) from studies using 
SPM; second statistical maps and effect-sizes maps are recreated; finally, individual maps are combined according to intra-study variance (i.e., 
studies with large sample sizes and/or lower error contribute more) and inter-study heterogeneity (i.e., studies with large variances contribute 
less). 
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(3) Meta-analysis can examine whether discoveries are reproducible. Similar to leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation, it can perform the so-called leave-one-study-out cross-validation: it 
first compares the estimate (e.g., mean activation of a brain lesion) from one study, iteratively, to 
the summarized estimate from the remaining (n-1, where n is the number of total studies) studies, 
and then judges, via the P-value, whether the conclusion made across the studies are reliable and 
reproducible. 
 
Conclusion 
Hypothesis testing and P-values have been widely used to investigate the associations between 
genetic, neural, and behavioural features, and to inquire into the efficacy of clinical treatments for 
diseases and disorders. Despite advances, many have questioned the validity of this testing 
mechanism, the appropriateness of P-values, and the validity of an arbitrarily determined 
significance level, for drawing scientific conclusions.   
In this review, in light of recent debates, we aimed to provide an overview of key 
confusions, controversies, and the central role of the P-value that may interest or concern 
biologists, clinicians, educators, epidemiologist, medical doctors, philosophers, and statisticians. 
To provide a relatively comprehensive, and balanced review, we first outlined the roles the P-value 
plays in scientific studies. In brief, the P-value makes the interpretation of evidence more 
convenient, ties the knots between results from different data sets, and makes discoveries from 
various studies comparable to one another. Having recognized its contributions and usefulness, we 
discussed the associations between the P-value, sample size, significance level, and statistical 
power. Following this, we presented common misuses and misinterpretations of the P-value, 
accompanied by our modest recommendations. To complement our discussion, we compared the 
Bayesian posterior evidence with the P-value. Finally, we discuss the advantages of meta-analysis 
in integrating and extracting evidence from multiple studies and data sets.  
The introduction of the P-value since the 18th century has advanced time and again 
hypothesis driven scientific discoveries. It underpins a clear decision-making system that is 
convenient to and accepted by a broad scientific, clinic, and medical communities; it provides a 
common, and simple rule that guides multiple experimenters to evaluate and compare individual 
findings based on respective P-values and a pre-agreed significance level; it evaluates the 
outcomes of a test on a continuous scale; it helps integrating results from multiple studies and 
datasets; and it facilitates causal enquires and provides a metric to evaluate and determine the 
existence and strength of potential causation that can be used during estimation of causal effect, 
cross-validation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical causal reasoning, cause alteration, 
and the method of instrumental variables. Today, it is being widely used in scientific enquires to 
test the relationship between group-specific, idiosyncratic, genetic and environmental features, the 
difference between outcomes from multiple geographical (such as corps from different fields) and 
biological (such as patterns from different brain areas), how external stimuli and environment 
factors affect genetic organizations and biological characteristics (such as heart rate and brain 
signals), how these patterns underpin human behaviors, and how their irregularity may lead to 
malfunction and illnesses. The P-value will, in our view, continue to play important roles in and 
advance hypothesis-testing based scientific enquires, whether in its current form or modified 
formulations; our analyses and examples highlight that its interpretations must be contextual, 
taking into account the scientific question, experimental design (including the sample size and 
significance level), statistical power, effect size, and reproducibility of the findings.  
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With little doubt, there will be a continual effort to find more rational ways to extract 
knowledge from data and to search for more suitable holistic interpretation for statistical and 
scientific evidence. As employing hypothesis testing and P-values is and will for the foreseeable 
future remain one of the standard practices in scientific enquiries, a beginning can be made by 
improving our understanding of its strength, weakness, usefulness, and misuses. We hope that our 
discussion here could make some contribution towards this pursuit. 
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